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Abst rac t: The contemporary times are characterized by a radical withdrawal from the tradi-
tional principles of normative ethics. The commonly encountered attitudes are axiological plural-
ism, permissivism, and moral relativism. The results of research on attitudes and preferences of 
young Poles indicate towards a clear advantage of interest in hedonistic and utilitarian values, as 
well as a disrespectful approach to the examples of order and harmony. What is instead valued 
are such moral values as honesty, honor, and helpfulness. However, we need to ask whether the 
research method adequately reflects the real preferences. It is possible that the axiological disori-
entation among youth has its roots in the lack of skills of a proper understanding and expression 
of own intuition in the area of values. The author suggests that we should contemplate alternative 
methodology, modeled and based on the Ph. Johnson-Laird’s situation analysis.
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Twilight of Normativeness, 
Tyranny of the Cultural Idiom 
Steve Wilcox writes that we all live in a permissive epoch, referred to as the 
“ludic century.” In sociological and philosophical culture and? literature we can 
also find different names used to define this socio-civilizational structure, for 
instance, “entertainment society” or “Erlebnisgesellschaft.”1 What is happening 
1 See Gerhard Schulze, Erlebnisgesellschaft. Kultursoziologie der Gegenwart (Frankfurt 
a. M.: Campus Bibliothek +, 1992). 
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in a cultural framework defined in such a way―and partially what has already 
happened―is a radical rebuilding of the way the social model functions: a post-
normative society, in which cultural and social norms to a bigger and bigger 
extent cease to fulfill the regulatory functions, is born and is developing. The 
place of the regulatory functions is occupied by components of the mass culture; 
among them a prominent place is taken by the omnipresent computer games. 
The world of games, together with its entire encasement of virtual reality, cap-
tured, with a mighty force, the entire human imagination, first of all the young 
ones. That is from this sources that more and more often the young (however 
not only them) draw examples of attitudes and behavior, which gradually take 
root and then serve people in their adult life.2
One of the prominent features of the contemporary times is the change of at-
titude to the phenomenon of normativeness. According to Ryszard Moń, “since 
1960s we have been witnessing an incessant attempt to call into question the 
normative order in all areas of social and moral life […] performance understood 
in the widest possible way […] owing to mass media contributes in a significant 
way to transforming the current reality and constitutes an attempt to create new 
norms of conduct.”3 
Simultaneously, we are witnessing a serious crisis of ethics and axiology. 
The current beliefs about sources of norms and obligations are being chal-
lenged.4 The classical ethics (not only Christian, but also, among others, per-
2 “All of this converges in a potentially promising century, one in which an art form that 
is ideally suited to fostering understanding rises to cultural prominence at the same time that 
it begins to more accurately reflect the various communities that make up our culture. This 
suggests to me that the ludic century has the potential to realize a post-normative state, one in 
which cultural and social norms no longer serve their regulatory function, as the ever-expan-
ding library of games that produce new contexts, and afford the discovery of new knowledge, 
begin to obsolesce the very idea of a norm. Such a state arises out of a gaming culture that 
increasingly relies on active collaboration and community engagement, rather than outdated 
norms and tropes, as its members continue to understand how systems—be them social, politi-
cal, cultural, or ludic— impact all persons.” Steve Wilcox Videogames and Empathy. Towards 
a Post-Normative Ludic Century, 2015, http://www.firstpersonscholar.com/videogames-and-em 
pathy/, accessed 26.10.2017; cf. Eric Zimmerman Manifesto for the Ludic Century 2013, https://
ericzimmerman.wordpress.com/2013/09/09/manifesto-for-a-ludic-century/, Accessed August 31, 
2018.
3 Ryszard Moń, Wpływ performatyki na nowe rozumienie normatywności, in, O norma-
tywności w etyce, edited by P. Duchliński, A. Kobyliński, R. Moń, and E. Podrez, 193–208. 
Kraków: WAM, 2015.
4 “In the situation of a frequent discrediting or even negating the point of referring to su-
perior values, the meaning of the presence of standpoints […] underlining the role of values 
and referring to their phenomenological depictions […] in our culture is difficult to overestima-
te”―Katarzyna Olbrycht writes: Prawda, dobro i piękno w wychowaniu człowieka jako osoby 
(Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2000), 124. Also, Janusz Nagórny warns us 
against such a threat for axiological objectivism: “If a man loses the perspective of the aim and 
point of life then, at the same time, he is incapable of a full reading of the objective hierarchy of 
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sonalistic and phenomenological) was looking for these sources in the objec-
tive world order,5 the integral component of which was to be the hierarchy of 
value―invariable, not relativized historically and not reducible to subjective 
evaluation.6 However, currently, as Moń notices, “all possible normativeness is 
a derivative of a vision of a happy life, which a subject has, and some idiom 
of conduct; moral, cultural, organizational, technical” and as such “is charac-
terized by a large arbitrariness, since every human being has his or her own 
vision of what is beneficial for him or her or can bring him or her happiness.”7 
Inclining towards such a vision, we forget that “the elementary theorem of 
personalistic pedagogy suggests that man can develop to the full only when 
he or she has a personal example apart from him or her that is transcendent 
in relation to him/herself. A culture, the final reality and measure of which is 
the very man, becomes a threat to him or her.”8 
The permissivism, which Wilcox addressed as a determinant attitude in the 
contemporary culture makes us accept the relativization and subjectivization 
of norms,9 not only the moral ones; but also esthetical and other. The illustra-
tive example confirming the accuracy of these diagnoses are results of a great 
many empirical studies, showing attitudes of the contemporary man in the face 
of values. Not long ago one of such studies was conducted on a representative 
group of one thousand secondary school students from the Kujawy-Pomerania 
value. That is when he forgets about the fundamental principles of this set of values. Lower va-
lues constitute the basis of human existence and are necessary as a means: since they constitute 
a condition to achieve other values, higher values. That is why lower values cannot constitute 
a real aim of life, they are merely a means to an end”―Janusz Nagórny, Świat przełomu tysiącle-
ci – wyzwania wychowawcze, in Dzieła wybrane. Wychowanie do wartości, edited by K. Jeżyna 
(Lublin: RW KUL 2012), 39–40.
5 “The basis for morality is the ontic foundation, which explains the fact of morality, 
which is one of the most personal phenomena in a man’s life”―Krzysztof Stachewicz explains: 
W poszukiwaniu podstaw moralności (Kraków: Universitas 2001), 7.
6 “The value of an object exists, or at least can exist ‘objectively’ (‘really’) does not at all 
depend on our cognition or one or another way of behaving.” Roman Ingarden, Uwagi o względ-
ności wartości, in Przeżycie – dzieło – wartość (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie 1966), 209. 
7 Moń, Wpływ performatyki, 194.
8 Franciszek Adamski, Personalistyczna wizja kultury, in Pedagogika kultury – wychowanie 
do wartości, edited by Bogusław Żurakowski (Kraków: Impuls, 2003), 33.
9 “Permissivism consists in a belief that, in fact, it does not matter who, what and how. 
However, it never works like that. Permissivism does not mean that I ‘allow myself,’ but it 
means that the ‘society allows,’ ‘democracy allows.’ It is the liberal society that is permissive, 
since it does not create obligations, resigns from condemning adulterers, as if it was no diffe-
rence, rejects the permanence of matrimony, allows abortion […]. Permissivism is an accusation 
against the society, not against an individual, who is capable of handling his conscience on his 
own”―Józef Tischner explains in: J. Tischner, A. Michnik, and J. Żakowski, Między Panem 
a Plebanem (Kraków: Znak 1995), 97.
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Province10. The subject of research were the beliefs about the preference of val-
ues, and the research methodology was based on the so called Scheler Values 
Scale (SVS), adopted and prepared by Piotr Brzozowski.11 
Question about the Importance 
of the Contemporary Axiological 
Breakthrough
Before I move on to present the analysis and a comment to the research, it is 
worth, on the margin, highlighting the fact that the research of attitudes in the 
face of norms and values are nothing new. Also Jesus was subjected to such 
research―by the then experts in ethics and axiology, so law and religion schol-
ars: Pharisees and Sadducees. It was not, obviously, scientific research aiming 
at establishing an objective state of affairs, but instead it was a repeated at-
tempt to “test him” [Matthew 22, 35] and “try to trap him” [Mat 22, 15]. Since 
when it came to some issues there was a mutual agreement between them and 
the Teacher (Pharisees and Sadducees accepted Jesus’ answer to the question: 
“Which is the greatest commandment in the law?” [Mat 22, 35]); however, the 
more Jesus was preaching Gospel, the more discrepancies appear in the com-
prehension of the structure of norms and obligations between the followers of 
the Old and New Covenant. 
In the history of peoples, cultures, and civilizations there are breakthrough 
moments, which radically change stances and beliefs about what is good and 
what is bad, and what should be done and what avoided. Obviously, not all of 
them equal to the Incarnation of the Son of God, which brought the greatest 
turning point in the outlook in history. However, the smaller ones should not be 
ignored as well. 
10 See Magdalena Wędzińska, „Preferencje wartości uczniów szkół ponadgimnazjalnych – 
próba charakterystyki,” Przegląd Pedagogiczny no 2 (Bydgoszcz 2017), 102–124.
11 Cf. Piotr Brzozowski, Skala wartości Schelerowskich – SWS (Warszawa: Pracownia Te-
stów Psychologicznych Polskiego Towarzystwa Psychologicznego 1995). 
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Polish Youth and Their World of Values
With full awareness that the chances to obtain a trustworthy diagnosis of the 
contemporary outlook situation within the area of norms, obligations and values 
are slim and the generations that will come after us will know how deep the axi-
ological stances were transformed at the beginning of the third millennium, we 
will, nevertheless, try to have a closer look at what results from the conducted 
investigations and analyses―at least from the aforementioned survey research. 
Their author, a Doctor of Philosophy in Pedagogy Magdalena Wędzińska, pre-
sents and comments the obtained results in the following way:
1.  “Analyzing the issue of values preferred by the youth studying in secondary 
schools Max Scheler’s value ethics was used as a theoretical background. It 
has a deeply humanistic dimension―it defines the direction of man’s trans-
gression. What is more, Scheler’s contemplation of the place of man in the 
Worlds, his role and conditions, which make him a man, became unusu-
ally inspiring for the anthropological pedagogy (Ablewicz, 2003; Ostrowska, 
2006). Values as understood by Scheler are of an objective character (they 
exist as the Worlds characteristics).”12 
2.  “According to Scheler there are four groups of informal values: hedonis-
tic, vital, spiritual and religious values. The hierarchy of values tells us to 
take into consideration the dependencies between values. Transfer from 
a lower value to a greater one, according to Scheler, signifies a moral choice. 
[…] There are three types of spiritual values. The first one are the values of 
what is beautiful and what is ugly, so esthetic values. The second type of 
spiritual values are values of what is just and what is unjust, which are the 
basis of an objective legal order, which does not depend on political systems. 
The third one are values of learning the truth. […] The religious values cor-
respond with states of happiness and despair connected with proximity or 
remoteness of what is saintly. Religious values are the greatest values.”13
3.  Value evaluation method: “Scheler Values Scale was created by Piotr Br-
zozowski on the basis of the values classification prepared by Max Scheler. 
The scale makes it possible to construct a hierarchy of values, understood as 
some groups of values, not as isolated values. The scale is used to evaluate 
the elementary values: hedonistic (H), vital (V), esthetic (E), truth (T), moral 
(M) and religious (R). The vital values scale includes two factors: fitness 
and physical condition (FPC) and resistance to tiredness (RT). The religious 
values scale includes the following factors: secular sanctities (SS) and reli-
gious sanctities (RS). The scale presents values from 0 to 100, depending on 
12 Wędzińska, „Preferencje wartości uczniów,” 103.
13 Wędzińska, „Preferencje wartości uczniów,” 103–104.
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the grade of preferences (the value of 100 is assigned to the values that are 
most preferred, whereas value 0 to the least preferred). The values are in an 
alphabetical order.”14
4.  “The research I conducted involved secondary school students from the prov-
ince of Kujawsko-Pomorskie. The research was conducted in Bydgoszcz, 
Toruń and Włocławek, from January 2016 till June 2016. Among the par-
ticipants were 372 students from comprehensive schools, 381 from technical 
schools and 327 from vocational schools. The sample was representative.”15
5.  Summary of the results.
a)  “The surveyed youth held the lowest esteem for esthetical values con-
nected with looking for harmony, order, regularity or arrangement. These 
values are connected not only with reception of works of art, but they 
refer to the way of functioning of a human being in the world (arranging 
the space of own life both in the physical as well as mental way). Do the 
examined youth not aim at arrangement in their life? Have they got settled 
in the world, in which the only thing that is certain is a change? On the 
opposite pole the researchers located moral values connected with acting 
to the benefit of other people, fairness, life based on honor and honesty. 
Similarly important are for the researchers values connected with per-
sonal development, especially cognitive development, widening one’s in-
tellectual horizons. The surveyed people have nothing against an easy and 
pleasurable life, which is proved by a high position of hedonistic values 
in the values hierarchy of the examined people. Life has to be prosperous, 
comfortable, full of happiness and abundant in various and rich expe-
riences. Holy values are also important for the examined youth. Young 
people, however, have higher esteem for secular sanctity connected with 
fatherland, national identity and patriotism. Values of a religious sanctity 
character (God, faith, redemption, eternal life) are of a lower importance 
for the surveyed people.”16
b)  “Comparing the results of own research with the exemplary Max Scheler’s 
value hierarchy we can establish that the surveyed youth choose a path of 
life which is, as a matter of fact, a shortcut. Scheler postulate that all types 
of values have to be recognized and explored through the prism of own 
life experiences. The hierarchical value structure that he introduced was 
at the same time a peculiar ‘ladder,’ climbing which man was supposed 
to experience his own being, walk toward transgression. The surveyed 
youth in their preferences reverses the order of values. In their choices of 
14 Wędzińska, „Preferencje wartości uczniów,” 105. See Piotr Brzozowski, Skala Wartości 
Schelerowskich – kwestionariusz, http://sirius.cs.put.poznan.pl/~inf74839/a…/Skala%20Wartos 
ci%20Schelerowskich-SWS.doc 
15 Wędzińska, „Preferencje wartości uczniów,” 105.
16 Wędzińska, „Preferencje wartości uczniów,” 122.
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what is important and valuable, they want to combine an easy, pleasurable 
life, based on, first and foremost, taking care of oneself, with a life which 
can be characterized by placing the other human’s good above own, with 
sacrifices, and sometimes offerings. That is where a question appears, is 
it even possible? The surveyed, young people wander in an axiological 
chaos―on the one hand, they long for order, high ideals, human solidar-
ity and moral principles, which would define their way of life, and on the 
other, they cannot escape a loud offer of the contemporary life: all has to 
be effortless, without merits, fast, easy and pleasurable, without conse-
quences. 
Such an arrangement of values by the young people might be an attempt to 
show that 
I am looking for a teacher and master
make him restore my sight and speech
make him once again call things and concepts
make him separate light from darkness 
like the title Survivor from Tadeusz Różewicz’s poem.17 
What Does the Scheler’s Value Scale Tell Us?
The presented results of research on axiological attitudes of youth point towards 
a significant change of preferences in comparison with the previous generations. 
The order of values presented by Scheler, and commonly accepted as a basis 
for methodological socio-psychological contemplation, was, in practice, negated, 
and in its place a new, more random and wobbly, however, definitely different 
scale begins to appear. It is worth to ask what it proves. I would like to present 
the following variant of possible answers:
1.  Max Scheler and other philosophers as well as scholars are wrong when they 
suggest that the values are objective. The following argument of Friedrich 
Nietzsche and supporters of axiological relativism, inspired by his works, 
should be accepted: 
a) man is a creator of values and not their discoverer,
b)  the subject creating new values is autonomous and sovereign in his de-
cisions, is not subject to pre-established systems of external norms and 
obligations,
17 Wędzińska, „Preferencje wartości uczniów,” 122–123.
Philosophy48
c)  values are identical with acts or content of appraising judgments, these 
instead have the status of subjective psychical acts.18
2.  There is an objective order of values, however, the subject of morals activity 
has―also objectively―difficulties with its accurate recognition. Values as in-
tegral elements of objective structure of reality are something different from 
subjective preferences and evaluations, however, in a common awareness this 
difference is wiped out. Since the contemporary civilization is characterized 
by a strong naturalistic and reductionalistic orientation, then what becomes 
almost a “cultural norm” is the attitude based on the so called naturalis-
tic error. This attitude suggests (in short): “what is natural is good.”19 The 
forms of preferential thinking that refer to it accept that a spontaneous aim-
ing of a subject at obtaining some good―or the desire of this good alone―is 
a measure of the value of the subject of intention: the more I want something, 
the bigger its value is.
3.  Values exist objectively and a human being has the ability to recognize them, 
as Scheler taught, however, with this difference that this ability is not of an 
innate character, but of an acquired one. It is potentially present in the form 
of a seed in the human soul, however, it required updating in the way of 
teaching and practicing, similarly as the Aristotle’s virtues.
The Need for 
New Axiological Education Models
I believe it is the most accurate to opt for the third of the above-presented 
answers. However, it causes a necessity to trigger a serious discussion on op-
timization and contemporization of the existing axiological education models. 
In particular, it is important to have a closer look at the concept of language 
competence within this area, so the skills of calling and communicating values 
and expressing in a clear and articulate way the value judgment.
The research of linguists on the ways of communication among the young 
in the contemporary times shows that the level of language competence with-
in the area of axiology is very low. The authors refer to this phenomenon as 
18 See Franz Brentano, O źródle poznania moralnego (Warszawa: PWN, 1989), Uzupełnie-
nie IX: Miłowanie i nienawidzenie, 98–126.
19 “What is justified is to call a naturalistic error confusing the quality of ‘good,’ which 
is not a natural subject, with any subject of nature […] even if the quality of ‘good’ were 
a subject of nature, it would not change the essence of error, nor would it lessen its importance.” 
 G. E. Moore, Zasady etyki, translated by Czesław Znamierowski (Warszawa: M. Arct, 1919), 13.
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“functional illiteracy.”20 It consists in the fact that the participants to a language 
communication, even if they use terms expressing and calling values, do not 
understand the meanings of this terms correctly. They repeat them automatically 
and thoughtlessly put in random contexts or give them their own meanings, also 
very random and separated from reality. 
It might turn out that the survey research, similar to the ones presented above, 
do not achieve the assumed cognitive results―since they do not reflect the real 
beliefs of respondents concerning values and their preference, but merely unveil 
the low level of communication competence. Therefore, what seems essential 
in this type of research is an additional evaluation, verifying whether and to 
what extent the surveyed people understand the content of the instructions and 
meaning of terms, which, as assumed, they should use. Since in reality it often 
happens that the concepts derived from the abstract language of philosophy, 
referring to the area of values and valuing, do not belong to the lexical stock 
of the respondents and do not create any associations in their minds, or even 
mislead them. It is worth considering the introduction of an alternative research 
technique, not based on more and more unreliable scale of values inscribed in 
the outdated models of language communication. The source of inspiration for 
the alternative methodology could be the situation analysis method, similar to 
the one suggested by Philip Johnson-Laird21 with reference to solving the logi-
cal tasks. He believes that when people reason, then they do not use abstract 
schemes, but, instead, they make use of picture models of situations described 
by factors and conclusions. Johnson-Laird thinks that people are rational in their 
nature, and often the cause of errors in reasoning is not the lack of knowledge 
of rule of logic, but restriction of operation memory responsible for a correct 
construction of mental models. If so, then what is key for conducting correct 
analyses is the ability to construct situation models in imagination, models that 
would reflect the problem structure of a task.22
What emerges from the discussion on the credibility of theoretical assump-
tions of empirical research on the stance of contemporary man in the face of 
values is a hypothesis, which suggests that possibly these attitudes do not dif-
fer so much from conclusions of the Scheler’s philosophical value theory and 
other, having more contemporary scientific discourse, theories based on it. The 
reasons for the discrepancy discovered in the research might be the reason of 
the chosen methodology. However―even if it so―we should not disregard the 
20 Aldona Skudrzyk and Jacek Warchala, Literacy of the Young Generation in a Diglossic 
Environment, transl. by A. Dylik, A. Lisoń, and M. Udalska (Katowice: W. Walasek 2012), 7.
21 See Philip Johnson-Laird, Mental Models and Human Reasoning, Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, October 26, 2010, http://www.pnas.org/con 
tent/107/43/18243, accessed August 31, 2018.
22 Cf. Krzysztof A. Wieczorek, „Dlaczego wnioskujemy niepoprawnie? Teoria modeli men-
talnych P. N. Johnsona-Lairda,” Filozofia Nauki tom 70 (2007), 111–134.
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destructive role of incorrect cultural, customary, and moral examples. A real 
chance to remedy these pathologies within this area would be to introduce 
a coherent, well-thought-out program of axiological education.23 One of the op-
tions is to base such a program on the concept of mental models, adapted to 
the conditions of preferential thinking24. In this case the objective would be to 
exercise the ability to decide axiological dilemmas―instead of basing them on 
abstract concepts and reasoning schemes―by means of perfecting the ability of 
constructing specific situational models, unveiling both the real and the desired 
preferences of a subject.
Every organ that is not used deteriorates. If this is conscience―the elemen-
tary moral sense of man―then the consequence of its deterioration is a pathetic 
helplessness towards the everyday tasks consisting in deciding objectively on 
difficult choices between values. Lack of good axiological education still deep-
ens this difficulty of the contemporary man. If we want the next generations 
to live in an orderly world, in terms of values and normalized by means of the 
commonly understood examples of preferences, we must not neglect the duty of 
giving a credible testimony of life and thinking according to values, which we 
ourselves perceive to be worth implementing in this and the next world.
23 A similar question―whether the currently realized educational examples are still time-
ly, or already outdated―is put forward by, among others, Beata Bilicka, when she says: “The 
phenomenon of advancing globalization of the world, in which we live, questioning the ultimate 
significance of moral norms and hierarchy of values […], individualization of stances and moral 
behaviors of the contemporary man―these are only some of the features of the epoch referred 
to as postmodernism. It leads to―especially in education―to questioning the current vision of 
education. Thus important questions concerning the timeliness of pedagogy […] and tradition of 
the Christian educational system appear. […] Therefore, a particularly important issue currently 
is […] question: how to educate to value in the world of cyberculture? Such a question should 
be asked by every educator, counselor, every teacher.” Beata Bilicka, ed. Słowo wstępne, in 
Wychowanie do wartości w świecie cyberkultury (Toruń: UMK, 2012), 10–12.
24 Within this context Józef Tischner’s words are outstanding: “When we say that our world 
is a world of values, we see specific issues and things next to us. Maybe even more ‘issues’ than 
‘things.’ Someone was waiting for us a second ago since he had an issue he wanted to discuss, 
we were waiting to tell him something important, someone came down with an illness and 
a medication had to be bought, someone passed away and we had to participate in a funeral, 
someone was happy because he had a wedding. […] That is how we are put in the necessity of 
an incessant placing something above something else, the necessity to prefer. […] We do not 
know how to precisely define the rule, according to which we make our decisions, and still we 
live since we know how to place some things above others.” Józef Tischner, Myślenie według 
wartości (Kraków: Znak 1982), 483–484.
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Krzysztof T. Wieczorek
Le besoin d’éduquer aux valeurs à l’époque postnormative
Résu mé
Les temps contemporains se caractérisent par le retour radical des principes traditionnels de 
l’éthique normative. Le pluralisme axiologique, le permissivisme et le relativisme moral sont 
les attitudes universellement rencontrées. Les résultats des recherches sur les attitudes et les 
préférences des jeunes Polonais dénotent le net avantage de l’intérêt pour les valeurs hédonistes 
et utilitaires ainsi que l’attitude irrespectueuse à l’égard des modèles de l’ordre et de l’harmonie. 
En revanche, on estime les valeurs morales telles que l’honnêteté, l’honneur et la serviabilité. 
Il faut pourtant s’interroger si les méthodes analytiques reflètent adéquatement les préférences 
réelles. Il se peut que la désorientation axiologique résulte de ce que les jeunes manquent d’une 
capacité de discerner correctement leurs propres intuitions dans le domaine des valeurs et de les 
exprimer. L’auteur propose de réfléchir sur une méthodologie alternative, inspirée de l’analyse 
situationnelle de Philip Johnson-Laird.
Mots - clés : postnormativité, jeunes, préférences, échelle de valeurs, éducation axiologique
Krzysztof T. Wieczorek
La necessità dell’educazione ai valori nell’epoca post-normativa
Som mar io
I tempi attuali si distinguono per l’allontanamento radicale dai principi tradizionali dell’etica 
normativa. Le condotte comunemente riscontrate sono il pluralismo assiologico, il permissivi-
smo e il relativismo morale. I risultati degli studi sulle condotte e sulle preferenze dei giovani Po-
lacchi indicano una netta prevalenza dell’interesse per i valori edonistici ed utilitaristici nonché 
un atteggiamento noncurante nei confronti dei modelli di ordine e armonia. Sono però apprezzati 
valori morali come l’onestà, l’onore e la compiacenza. Occorre tuttavia domandare se i metodi 
di ricerca rispecchino adeguatamente le preferenze reali. È possibile che il disorientamento as-
siologico tra i giovani abbia origine dall›incapacità di identificare correttamente e di esprimere 
le proprie intuizioni nella sfera dei valori. L’autore suggerisce di riflettere su una metodologia 
alternativa, ispirata all’analisi situazionale di Philip Johnson-Laird.
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